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INTRODUCTION
The petitioner# the Utah Bankers Association (the "UBA"),
has filed this Reply Brief in support of its petition for judicial
review.

The UBA seeks judicial review of an order of the

Commissioner of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions
(respectively, the "Commissioner11 and the "Department") approving
an application of Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. (the
"CUSC Applicant") to operate a "credit union service center" in
Utah (the "CUSC") on behalf of several Utah credit unions.

The

CUSC has intervened to join the Commissioner as respondents in this
matter•
In
application

brief
because

summary,
it

the

expressly

UBA

objected

assumes

and

to

the

CUSC

perpetuates

a

fundamental misapplication by the Commissioner of the Utah statutes
that limit geographically defined "fields of membership" for Utah
credit unions.

Those statutes limit membership of Utah credit

unions with geographic

(rather than associational)

fields of

membership to the residents of an area no more expansive than one
county.

By approving the CUSC application, the Commissioner

improperly allowed those credit unions to claim and solicit members
from multiple counties.
The UBA also objected to the CUSC application because the
Commissioner failed to apply the statute that limits such centers
to providing services through "automated or electronic" means.
-1-

I.

STATEMENTS BY THE HEARING OFFICER THAT THE MULTI-COUNTY FIELD
OF MEMBERSHIP WAS NOT AT ISSUE ARE IRRELEVANT.
The respondents' references to statements made by the

Department's

hearing

officer

that

the

multi-county

membership was not at issue are irrelevant.

field

of

The record of the

hearing is clear that the credit union participants in the CUSC,
including several credit unions claiming multi-county fields of
membership, anticipate the use of the CUSC as a means to solicit
new

memberships.

Furthermore,

the

Commissioner

restated

the

Department's belief that Utah credit unions can have geographic
fields of membership covering multiple counties.

In short, the

Commissioner approved the solicitation of memberships through the
CUSC with a fundamental assumption that violates the field of
membership statutes.
Any

statement

by

the

hearing

officer

regarding

the

relevance of the field of membership issue was made only in light
of the Department's desire to restate the Department policy to
disregard

the

statutory

field

of

membership

limitations

and

apparently to make it clear that because of that policy it was not
an issue that would be entertained despite the fact that it was
specifically raised by the UBA.

The statement was not based on any

determination that solicitation of membership was irrelevant to the
CUSC

application

participants.

or

to

Moreover,

the

activities

arguments

-2-

by

of
the

the

CUSC

and

respondents

its
that

solicitation will occur only within each credit union , s field of
membership is meaningless if the field, as identified, violates
state law.
II.

THE FIELD OF MEMBERSHIP CONSTRAINTS THAT ARE APPLICABLE TO
EACH CREDIT UNION ARE ALSO APPLICABLE TO THE CUSC.
The respondents then make the flawed argument that the

field of membership statutes, although applicable to individual
credit unions, are not applicable to the CUSC.
suggest that the participating
permitted

to

undertake

credit unions

activities

through

The respondents
in the CUSC

the

otherwise prohibited when undertaken otherwise.

that

are

The participating

credit unions cannot do collectively that which
individually.

CUSC

are

is prohibited

Unlawful solicitation of new members will remain

just as unlawful even if conducted through the conduit of the CUSC.

III.

THE COMMISSIONER CANNOT APPROVE BRANCHING IF ONE OF THE
PURPOSES OF THE BRANCH IS TO ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY.
To

divert

attention

from

the

field

of

membership

statutes, the respondents improperly recast the UBA's opposition to
the CUSC application

as being an issue as to the permissible

location of branch offices.
the branching

statutes; it seeks enforcement

membership statutes.
offices.

The UBA is not seeking enforcement of
of the field

of

The issue is not with the location of branch

The issue is whether the Commissioner may approve a
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credit union branch when the Commissioner has received sworn
testimony that one of the purposes of that branch is to solicit
memberships among residents who are not qualified to be members.
In an attempt to illustrate a relationship between
branching and the field of membership limitations, the UBA posed a
hypothetical circumstance involving a credit union with a field of
membership that includes the residents of Davis County.

The UBA

suggested that it may be appropriate for that credit union to have
a branch in downtown Salt Lake City to provide services for Davis
County residents who work in Salt Lake City but not appropriate to
claim a branch office in Utah County given the more remote
relationship between Utah County and the Davis County field of
membership.
The point of this hypothetical is not whether the Davis
County credit union could have a branch office in Utah County. The
point is that if the Commissioner in that instance approved a Utah
County branch, such approval would need to be with a mandate, as
required

by

statute, that

residents of Utah County.

the membership

could

not

include

The Commissioner could not approve the

Utah County branch with the understanding that a purpose of that
branch was to solicit memberships from Utah County residents in
violation of the field of membership statute.
Similarly, it was incorrect for the Commissioner to
approve the CUSC application with the express understanding that it
-4-

will be used by credit unions that claim multi-county fields of
membership

to

solicit memberships

from multiple

counties

in

violation of state law.
The Commissioner bears the responsibility of enforcing
the state statutes regarding financial institutions and has been
entrusted with certain powers to ensure compliance,

for example,

Utah Code Annotated §7-1-307 provides that " [i]f the [Commissioner
has determined that any institution . . . is about to violate any
applicable provision of this title, . . . the [Commissioner may
issue a cease and desist order against such institution . . . . "
The proposed violations of the field of membership statute by the
CUSC participants is not only an instance in which the Commissioner
has chosen not to enforce a statutory violation. The Commissioner
has, in fact, given his blessing to the prospective violation of
the statute.

The Commissioner cannot justify his approval of the

violation of the field of membership statute by characterizing it
as a branching issue.
IV.

THE WORD "COUNTY" CANNOT BE READ TO MEAN "COUNTIES".
The respondents' claim that the word "county" in the

field of membership statute should be read to mean "counties"
nullifies the entire field of membership statute. The respondents
draw from Utah Code Annotated §68-3-12 for the general proposition
that the singular includes the plural and that the plural means the

-5-

singular when undertaking statutory interpretation. However, such
interchangeable construction is not permitted if it "would be
inconsistent with the manifest

intent of the Legislature or

repugnant to the context of the statute."

Id.

The definition of

field of membership, which assumes a "group,M Id. §7-9-3(5), is
based on the commonality of its members. The Legislature has drawn
the field of membership guidelines to recognize the various
organizational or geographic circumstances that could create such
a "group." A construction of that statute that, in effect, permits
a field of membership of all residents of Utah is inconsistent with
the intent of the statute and renders meaningless the carefully
drawn parameters for fields of membership.

It is true that a

credit union field of membership could reach from Brigham City to
St. George, but only if there is an associational basis for such a
membership which fulfills the fundamental assumption of a "group."

V.

THE CUSC CANNOT OPERATE IN VIOLATION OP THE STATUTORY
LIMITATIONS ON CREDIT UNION SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS.
The claim that the CUSC was approved under the general

provisions of Utah Code Annotated §7-1-303, which makes a general
statement regarding joint, cooperative efforts among financial
institutions, does not limit the specific application of Section 79-5(29), governing credit unions. Section 7-9-5(29) provides that
credit unions (with Commissioner approval) may:

-6-

participate in systems which allow the transfer,
withdrawal, or deposit of funds of credit unions or
credit union members by automated or electronic means and
hold membership in entities established to promote and
effectuate these systems, if the participation is not
inconsistent with the law and rules of the department,
and if any credit union participating in any system
notifies the department as provided by law.
The

services

that may

be provided

by

a credit~ union

service

organization for its participants are limited to services through
automated or electronic means.

The general principle of "shared

branches" is not contemplated by this section. Notwithstanding the
general references in Section 7-1-303 to cooperative, joint efforts
by

financial

institutions,

that

section

cannot

supersede

the

specific guidelines of Section 7-9-5(29) relating to credit unions.
General

provisions

regarding

cooperative

efforts

by

financial

institutions do not supersede the specific provisions applicable to
credit unions.

See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Board of

State Lands and Forestry of the State of Utah, 830 P.2d 233, 235
(Utah

1992)

(specific

statutory

language

controls

general

language) .

The consideration by the Commissioner of the CUSC

application

erroneously

Section 7-9-5(29).
the

limitations

failed

to

include

the

limitations

of

In fact, the Commissioner suggests that perhaps

of Section

7-9-5(29) posed

a problem

Department in considering the CUSC application.
Brief at 21.
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for the

Commissioner's

Also, as mentioned in the UBA's initial brief, the desire
of the CUSC Applicant and the participating credit unions to
operate the service center as a "full-service" shared branch of
each of the credit unions is an unlawful combination of a "branch"
and a "consumer funds transfer facility".

The

statutory

definitions of "branch" and "consumer funds transfer facility" are
harmonious, but were applied incorrectly by the Commissioner.

A

branch of a financial institution may receive and pay deposits,
other than as a consumer funds transfer facility. .Id. §7-1-103.
Yet, the CUSC Applicant's proposal demonstrates the intent to have
the

service

centers

serve

as

both

consumer

funds

transfer

facilities and as branches. Such intention violates the applicable
statutes that provide that such facilities are mutually exclusive.

VI.

NO DEFERENCE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE COMMISSIONER'S DISREGARD
OF THE LIMITED FIELD OF MEMBERSHIP STATUTES.
The respondents ask for deference in the ongoing decision

of the Department to permit state wide memberships for Utah state
credit unions.

The respondents seek justification from other

statutes

give

that

responsibilities.

the
By

Commissioner

describing

the

general
broad

powers

powers

of

and
the

Commissioner and the ability of the Commissioner to make findings
and determinations in a myriad of circumstances, the Commissioner
claims

discretion

in

the

application

-8-

of

the

geographical

limitations set forth by the Legislature.

Regardless of such

powers, the Commissioner cannot argue that his perspective (or the
perspective of Mr. Kwant, the source of the multi-county field of
membership) of the financial institution marketplace supersedes
legislative mandate and justifies a disregard for the detailed
definition of a "limited field of membership."

Although the

legislature may have delegated many broad responsibilities to the
Commissioner, those responsibilities do not include discretion to
ignore fundamental statutory limitations on Utah credit unions.
The

Commissioner

also

seeks

justification

for

the

disregard of the field of membership limitations by discussing the
liberalization of "branching" that has occurred in the state within
the last decade.
discretion

to

membership.
this matter.

But the Commissioner has not been granted any

alter

the

statutory

limitations

on

fields of

The Commissioner cannot assume a legislative role in
The ability of the CUSC participants to solicit

members in violation of the field of membership statute does not
turn on whether the disregard for the statute made sense, seemed
appropriate, or appeared necessary to the Commissioner.
The Commissioner claims also that the Court should give
deference to the Department's decision to permit unlimited fields
of membership L>y CUSC participants because of the Commissioner's
right to approve the credit union bylaws that set forth the limited
field of membership.

The right to approve the limited field of
-9-

membership in a set of bylaws does not assume the right to ignore
the statutory framework of those limitations.
The application of the field of membership statutes does
not require any fact finding by the Commissioner.
require the expertise of the Commissioner.

It does not

It does not raise

issues of discretion or judgment. The application of the field of
membership

statute

is a matter of

law.

The

Commissioner's

particular view of the statute is irrelevant.
A well known Utah branch banking case illustrates, by
analogy, that the application of the field of membership statute to
the activities of the CUSC participants is a matter of law. In the
case of Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 390 P.2d 592 (Utah
1964), Walker Bank filed a lawsuit to set aside a decision of the
state bank commissioner that allowed State Bank of Provo to open
another branch in Provo.

The Utah branching statute at the time

prohibited a state bank from branching in a city such as Provo
unless the bank takes over an existing bank.
State Bank of Provo argued that certainly the statute
should not prevent a bank from branching in its own community. The
Utah Supreme Court disagreed by applying the literal reading of the
branching statute.

The court was not persuaded by the state bank

commissioner's interpretation of the statute nor by prior decisions
of the commissioner to grant similar applications. The court said,
n

[S]uch actions are not persuasive in this case to induce us to
-10-

vary the very unambiguous terms of our branch banking statutes."
Id. at 595.

The court in the Walker Bank case recognized that

issues of statutory interpretation are for the courts, not the
agency.

The court said, "The question here involved, being

strictly one of law, is for the courts . . . ." Id.

VII. THE STATE COURT RECOGNIZED THAT THE FIELD OF MEMBERSHIP ISSUE
WAS A LEGAL ISSUE FOR THE COURT.
As this Court is aware, the Third District Court for Salt
Lake County dismissed a complaint filed by the UBA with respect to
the enforcement of the field of membership statutes after a
decision by the district court that the UBA members did not have
standing to seek compliance by its competitors with applicable
state law.

With due respect, the decision of the district court

not to address the statutory violations of Utah credit unions was
made

in

error,

and

the

UBA

has

appealed

that

dismissal.

Nonetheless, in the district court's memorandum decision, in which
the court improperly found a lack of standing, the Court emphasized
that no deference should be given to the Commissioner in his
interpretation or application of the field of membership statute.
The court stated:

"[T]he ultimate question presented by the [UBA]

is neither factual nor a mixed question of fact and law.

It is

purely a question of law, and the expertise of the Department does
not place it in a better position than this court to interpret the
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statutes enacted by the legislative branch."

Memorandum Decision

and Order at pp. 5-6 (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit ffF" to
the Commissioner's Brief).

VIII.

THE UBA HAS STANDING TO SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE CUSC
APPLICATION BECAUSE OF ITS INVOLVEMENT IN THE COMMISSIONER'S
PROCEEDING.
The UBA's involvement in the Commissioner's proceedings

to consider the CUSC application is grounds for standing to seek
judicial review of the Commissioner's decision in that proceeding.
The Commissioner recognized the right of the UBA to participate in
the Department's proceedings, served notice of the hearing on the
UBA, received and considered objections to the CUSC application
submitted by the UBA, and permitted the UBA to cross-exam witnesses
and

present

evidence

at

the

adjudicative

proceeding.

The

Commissioner cannot invite the UBA to participate in the agency
adjudicative process and then claim that the UBA has no standing to
seek judicial review of the Commissioner's proceedings.

The

Commissioner acknowledges in his responsive brief that the standing
of the UBA to participate in the Commissioner's proceedings was
recognized by the hearing officer.

Commissioner's Brief at 40.

Even putting aside the involvement of the UBA in the CUSC
application proceeding, any financial institution has the right to
ensure that a decision of the Commissioner to permit, in effect, a
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new

form

of

financial

institution

is made

pursuant

to and

consistent with applicable statutes. It would be wrong to suggest
that an institution cannot seek compliance by its supervisory
agency in approving the activities of a competing institution.

IX.

THE UBA HAS STANDING TO SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE
STANDING GUIDELINES ESTABLISHED BY UTAH LAW.
As mentioned previously in this Brief, the dismissal by

the Third District Court of a lawsuit seeking enforcement of the
field of membership statutes for lack of standing is being appealed
by the UBA.

This petition for judicial review of the CUSC

application does not carry with it the same standing inquiry.

As

stated previously, the involvement of the UBA in the Department
proceedings and the general right of a financial institution to
ensure that its supervisory agency follow applicable statutes in
approving the activities of its competitors make this petition for
judicial review unrelated to the determination of the state court
proceeding.

Nonetheless, the respondents have restated their

standing argument made in the district court.

Accordingly, this

Reply Brief will comment on the appropriate standing of the UBA
even under the standards suggested by the respondents.
A.

Utah law recognizes associational standing.

The UBA's petition for judicial review of the CUSC
application is consistent with the standing principles articulated
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by Utah case law.

First of all, Utah law has recognized the

ability of an association to bring an action on behalf of its
members.

Society of Professional Journalists, Utah Chapter v.

Bullock,

743

Journalists").

P.2d

1166,

1175

(Utah

1987)

("Society

of

Drawing on federal case law, the Utah Supreme Court

has stated that the association need only show that

" (i) the

individual members of the association have standing to sue; and
(ii) the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make
the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to
proper resolution of the case."

£d. , quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422

U.S. 490 (1975).
The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that this analysis
for associational

standing, which provides a practical way of

asserting common claims, is a "pragmatic one" and does not involve
a "sterile approach."

Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County

Board of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985).

Associational

standing permits the sharing of litigation costs and the attendant
risks, rather than requiring one member to bear that entire burden.
Id.

More importantly, the Utah Supreme Court is fearful that a

denial of associational standing may prevent "the assertion of
valid claims without serving any countervailing public purpose."
Id.

-14-

B.

The UBA members have individual standing to sue.

Utah case law has articulated three

(3) independent

grounds for the establishment of standing. Terracor v. Utah Board
of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986).

The

independent grounds articulated by the Utah Supreme Court are:
1.

Standing is established if the plaintiff can show

some "distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a
personal stake in the outcome of the dispute."
2.

Standing is established "if no one else has a

greater interest in the outcome of the case and the
issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that
particular plaintiff has standing to raise the issue."
3.

Standing will be established "if the issues are

unique and of such great public importance that they
ought

to

be decided

in

furtherance

of

the public

interest."
Id.

These independent grounds for standing have been recently

restated by this Court in the case of Sierra Club v. Department of
Environmental Quality. Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste, 857
P.2d 982,986-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The UBA has standing under each of these ground for
standing.

The UBA will be injured by the decision of the

Commissioner to permit the participating credit unions to use the
CUSC to solicit memberships in violation of the field of membership
-15-

statutes or to otherwise engage in activities not permitted by the
statutes permitting such service organizations; the UBA is the only
party that will seek enforcement of the applicable statutes; and
the statewide violation of the field of membership statute presents
a unique issue of public importance.
!•
standing."

The UBA members meet the "injury" grounds for

The Utah Supreme Court has discussed how the "injury"

requirement for standing can be satisfied when a party has claimed
an adverse effect from a governmental action.

In case of Society

of Professional Journalists, Utah Chapter v. Bullock. 743 P.2d 1166
(Utah 1987), journalists challenged a trial court's order that
closed a competency hearing in the Lafferty murder case. The court
began its analysis, which lead to the conclusion that standing was
proper, by identifying the common right of journalists, as well as
the public, to have access to judicial proceedings.

Although the

court acknowledged that because of this right it might be said that
if one person is denied access, that person has no interest that is
not held in common with all, and, as result that person has not
suffered a "personal adverse impact," the court, nevertheless, held
that in such instances, in which a complaint regarding improper
governmental action may seem "generalized," reference should be
made to "the policies underlying standing."

Id. at 1173-74.

Standing in such instances does not turn on whether each plaintiff
can show a personal adverse effect. Standing turns on whether the
-16-

dispute between the parties has crystallized.

Id.

The Court in

the Society of Journalists Case concluded that the plaintiffs had
satisfied the standing requirement, even though a personal adverse
affect had not been shown. The court drew additional comfort from
the fact that the issues of the case were not abstract and
academic.

They were concrete and crystallized.

Furthermore, the

rights were being pursued by those having a "direct interest." Id.
The decision of the Commissioner to permit Utah credit
unions to use the CUSC as a method to solicit memberships in
violation of the field of membership statute has and will result in
competitive and economic injury to Utah banks.

Furthermore, the

UBA, on behalf of those members, is not asserting a right that
requires or contemplates

the attention of another branch of

government.
Such attention has already been given to the issue by the
other branches of government.

The geographical scope of credit

union membership has already been decided by the Legislature in a
detailed statute.

Furthermore, the Utah Attorney General has

chosen by its support of the CUSC application to permit the
Commissioner to continue his disregard for credit union membership
statutes.
It is ironic for the Commissioner to be saying that the
court cannot hear this case when the Attorney General,s office has
made it clear that any recourse to the executive branch of
-17-

government by Utah banks to remedy this statutory violation with
respect to the CUSC would be futile.
The issues in this matter are concrete and clear.

The

issues do not involve a political or philosophical analysis; they
involve the legal limitations of the field of membership statute,
with objective geographical guidelines. The objections to the CUSC
application

are

brought

by

competitors

that

have

a direct,

competitive interest in ensuring compliance with those statutes.
The principles of standing should never warrant disregard of
objections brought by a party that alleges unlawful activities by
its competitor.
2.

The UBA has standing because no one else will bring

the statutory violations to the attention of the Court. It is very
unlikely that any other party will bring to the attention of the
courts the anticipated statutory violation by the CUSC and its
participating credit unions.
the UBA members.

This alone establishes standing for

The only party who could have possibly sought

compliance is the Attorney General. Instead, the Attorney General
has chosen to support the Commissioner and the participating credit
unions in the disregard for the statutory guidelines.

If the UBA

cannot seek compliance by the CUSC and its participants, then who
will?
3.
importance.

The statutory violations create an issue of public
The decision of the Commissioner to permit statewide
-18-

fields of memberships in violation of the statutory limitations on
such memberships presents an issue that affects the entire state.
These statutory violations do not affect only a company or a
particular group.

The violations affect the entire financial

institution industry and touches all geographic areas of Utah,
Furthermore, the Attorney General, given the responsibility of
ensuring

compliance

by

state

agencies,

has

abdicated

such

responsibilities in this instance.
C
The Third District Court erroneously ruled that the
UBA complaint to seek compliance with the field of membership
statute should be dismissed for lack of standing.
Again, this petition for judicial review is not intended
to address the recent decision

of the Third

District Court

dismissing the lawsuit by the UBA against the credit unions that
claimed

multi-county,

geographic

fields

of

memberships.

Nonetheless, given the respondents' argument regarding the standing
of the UBA to seek judicial review in this instance, coupled with
their references made to the state court decision, the UBA wanted
to briefly highlight, with due respect, some of the erroneous
analysis of the Third District Court regarding standing.

For

example, the district court did not focus on the "crystallized"
nature of the statutory violation which, as stated in Society of
Journalists, \:juld meet the "injury" requirement when addressing
the failure of government to comply with applicable law.

The

district court did not address the unwillingness of the Attorney
-19-

General to enforce the statutes.

The district court blended the

second and third independent grounds for standing.

Rather than

acknowledging standing on the grounds that no other party would
seek compliance (which fact the district court assumed to be true
and which alone would establish standing), the district court
stated that in such instances the party must also convince the
court that the issue is of public importance, thereby satisfying
the third basis for standing.

The district court failed to

recognize the independent nature of the second and third grounds
for standing. See Sierra Club v. Department of Environmental
Quality, Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste, 857 P.2d 982,986-87
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (which reiterates the independence of these
grounds for standing).

In light of these and other legal errors,

any reliance by this Court on the analysis of the district court in
the state court litigation with respect to standing would be
misguided.
D. The Members of the UBA Are Not Indispensable Parties.
The petition for judicial review filed by the UBA in a
representative capacity satisfies the second of the two elements
for associational standing.

The members of the UBA are not

indispensable parties to this effort to prevent the violation of
the field of membership statutes by the CUSC participants. Neither
the objections made by the UBA nor the relief it seeks with respect
to the CUSC application requires the UBA members to be a party to
-20-

this lawsuit. The objections of the UBA do not turn on the unique
circumstances of any one bank and the relief sought is not intended
to benefit one bank more than another. All members are intended to
be benefitted.

X.

THE DOCTRINES OF ESTOPPEL AND LACHES ARE INAPPLICABLE TO THE
CUSC APPLICATION.
The UBA objections to the recent CUSC application does

not raise any concerns of estoppel and laches. As acknowledged by
the respondents, the district court in the state court litigation
acknowledged that estoppel and laches do not prevent the UBA's
objection to the CUSC application.

Commissioner's Brief at 50.

Nonetheless, the respondents claim that the Commissioner can
approve the CUSC application notwithstanding its inherent statutory
violation because of the years that have passed since the Kwant
memorandum, which assumed

a legislative right to remove the

statutory limitations on geographic fields of memberships.
Neither estoppel nor laches is intended to permit a
violation of a statute by which the legislature has intended to
protect depositors and borrowers.

In effect, the defendants are

arguing that the UBA is barred from enforcing the statute because
of the credit union's reliance on the Commissioner's improper
approval of the expanded fields of membership. Given the objective
of the field of membership statutes to protect the depositors and
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borrowers, it is wrong to suggest that the public protection sought
by the legislature is subject to the doctrines of estoppel or
laches.

These

doctrines

individualized disputes.

have

their

place

in

private

or

They have no application in issues

involving or affecting the public at large.
As a general matter, arguments such as estoppel and
laches cannot be asserted with respect to actions of a governmental
entity.

See Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 827

(Utah 1992) .

The general rule is particularly true when a

misinterpretation of a statute has been made. The "rule safeguards
the interests of the public which may be jeopardized by the
'vagaries of political tides, frequent changes of public officials,
the possibility of collusion, or of circumventing procedures set up
by law, then suing for the value of goods furnished or services
rendered.7" Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 769 (Utah 1991) (quoting
Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982)).
An example of the Utah Supreme Court7s unwillingness to
use procedural arguments based on estoppel or delay to avoid the
consequences of a misinterpreted statute is found in Prows v Utah,
822 P. 2d 764 (Utah 1991).

In Prows. the plaintiffs sued the State

of Utah and the Department of Financial Institutions, after the
Department declared their thrift insolvent and seized its assets.
Id. at 765. The plaintiffs claimed that the state had represented
that the ILGC insurance fund was guaranteed by the state, and the
-22-

plaintiffs

sought

Institutions

from

to

estop

denying

the

that

Commissioner
the

thrift's

of

Financial

deposits

unconditionally insured up to $15,000 per depositor.

were

Id. at 769.

The court found the elements of estoppel present, but concluded
that estoppel could not be invoked against the state. Id.

In

reaching this result, the court relied on the general rule that
estoppel cannot be asserted where the activities in question are
strictly prohibited by statute. The Prows court concluded that the
Commissioner's representations were "in direct contravention of
[the] statutory limitations.

Id.

This principal that the passage of time or reliance does
not justify statutory violations has been recognized by other case
law.

See Enfield v. Kleppe. 566 F.2d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 1977)

("If [an] interpretive rule does not accurately express the meaning
contained in [the relevant] statutory provision, it cannot operate.
The statute prevails now and has prevailed from the outset.

The

length of time that the faulty regulation was on the books is of no
consequence because an administrative provision contrary to statute
must

be overturned

'no matter

how well

settled

and how long

standing.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton,
479 F.2d 842, 865 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied. 93 S.Ct. 1550 (1973));
Id. at 1143 ("Since the defective regulation wa c never valid, there
was no right to rely on it."); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Hickel,
432 F.2d 587, 591-92 (10th Cir. 1970) ("[T]he United States may not
-23-

be estopped from asserting a lawful claim by the erroneous • . •
actions or statements of its agents or employees . . . .

As harsh

as the tenet is under practical application, an administrative
determination running contrary to law will not constitute an
estoppel against the federal government." (footnote omitted));
Weese v. Davis County Comm'n, 834 P. 2d 1, 3 (Utah 1992) ("The
county has only those rights and powers granted it by the Utah
Constitution and statutes or those implied as a necessary means to
accomplish them. Any act by the county in excess of this authority
or forbidden by the Utah Constitution is null and void as an ultra
vires act." (footnotes omitted)); Id. at 4 ("[T]he promise itself
exceeded the county,s

authority.

One who contracts with a

governing body is presumed to know the statutory and constitutional
limits of its contracting authority. Therefore, there could be no
reasonable reliance on the county's alleged promise . . . ."
(footnote omitted)); City of Mercer Island v. Steinmann, 513 P.2d
80, 82 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) ("[Estoppel] will not be applied where
its application would interfere with the discharge of governmental
duties or where the officials on whose conduct estoppel is sought
to be predicated acted beyond their power.").
And finally, even if the Court believes that estoppel or
laches

has

violations

application,
of the field

such

application

of membership

would

statute

not justify
by the CUSC

participants. A claim of estoppel or laches assumes that there has
-24-

been some act of detrimental reliance by the party making the
claim. See Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liouor Control Commission.
602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979).

No such reliance would exist with

pending CUSC application and the prospective operations of the
CUSC.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the UBA requests an order denying
the CUSC application.
.
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